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MARINE MAMMAL PROTECTION ACT
NOT APPLICABLE IN FOREIGN WATERS

INTERNATIONAL LAW: Provisions in the Marine Mammal Protection Act prohibiting the capture of dolphins and other marine
mammals by American citizens held not to apply in waters controlled by sovereign nations other than the United States. United
States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1977).
In the case of United States v. Mitchell,' the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals was faced with the task of determining what geographic
limitations there are, if any, in the application of the Marine Mammal
Protection Act (MMPA). 2 Specifically the court had to determine
whether the provisions of the act applied to an American citizen capturing dolphins in the territorial waters of a foreign state with the
permission of that nation.
The defendant, Jerry Mitchell, was an American citizen employed
by George Curtis Johnson, a citizen of the Bahamas and owner of a
marine attraction called Seafloor Aquarium in Nassau, Bahamas.
Johnson obtained for Mitchell from the Bahamian government a permit to capture dolphins. Mitchell received $800 from Seafloor for
each dolphin captured. It was apparently the intent of Johnson to
then export the dolphins to Great Britain.
The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) of the Department
of Commerce became aware of the plans and cautioned Mitchell that
a moratorium provision of the MMPA prevented any American citizen from capturing marine mammals, regardless of where the capture
took place. Mitchell was advised to consult a lawyer as well as the
Washington office of the NMFS. And he was informed that because
Seafloor "is located in a foreign country," it would not be issued a
United States permit to capture dolphins under § 1371 of the
MMPA.
Mitchell contacted an agent for the NMFS to inquire about receiving the necessary permit to capture dolphins. He was told that he
would need a permit to capture dolphins but that the commission
which considered and approved applications for permits had not yet
been appointed.
1. 553 F.2d 996 (1977).
2. 16 U.S.C. § §1361 etseq. (1975 Supp.).
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On consultation with his attorney, Mitchell was told that his
planned operation in the Bahamas would be lawful. Because his lawyer had advised him that he was not subject to United States jurisdiction if his dolphin capturing activities took place in the Bahamian
territorial waters, he proceeded with the operation.
Subsequently, Mitchell was arrested and charged with capturing,
possessing and selling the dolphins. Mitchell admitted taking the
dolphins and was convicted and sentenced. Appeal was then taken.
Although Mitchell appealed on three grounds, the court considered
only the "question of the extraterritorial scope of the statute."
The purpose of the MMPA is to prevent depletion and extinction
of certain marine mammal species which now "are, or may be, in
danger of extinction or depletion as a result of man's activities. . .

."

Section 1371 of the act establishes a moratorium which is defined in
§ 1362(7) as a "complete cessation of the taking of marine mammals ...and marine mammal products, except as provided ..... " Pro-

vision is made in the act for permits to be issued in certain circumstances for various purposes such as "public display," provided the
applicant receives a favorable recommendation from the Marine
Mammal Commission and the Committee of Scientific Advisors on
Marine Mammals, both of which were established by the act.4 After
examining the provisions relating to the moratorium, the court found
no clear reference within the act relating to the geographic extent to
which the moratorium provisions were to apply.
In addition to the moratorium provisions, § 1372 provides for a
series of "specific prohibitions" dealing with the capture, possession
and sale of marine mammals. Unlike the moratorium provisions, the
prohibitions make specific reference to their geographic scope. The
prohibitions make it illegal for a "person subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States" to capture, etc. a marine mammal "on the high
seas or from the waters or on lands subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States." The court thereby concluded that the prohibitions
were not meant to apply to the capture of marine mammals in foreign waters.
The court next sought to determine whether the moratorium provisions of the MMPA were meant to have broader territorial application than the prohibitions. After examining the legislative history of
the MMPA and finding no clear answer to the question, the court
analyzed other aspects of the act in order to arrive at a conclusion.
The opinion makes it clear that, in the court's mind, Congress does
have the power to exercise jurisdiction over United States citizens in
3. Id. §1361.
4. Id. § §1401-07.

April 1978]

MARINE MAMMAL PROTECTION ACT

foreign nations and that citizenship alone is usually sufficient to
establish this jurisdiction. Thus, the court recognized the issue not as
being whether Congress has the authority to extend its jurisdiction to
American citizens overseas but whether in this particular instance
meant to so extend it.
Following the case of United States v. Bowman,' the court applied two principles of statutory construction to determine the extent to which Congress intended the MMPA to apply. First, the law is
examined to determine whether the nature of the offense calls for
extraterritorial application. If the nature of the law does not call for
such an application, then there is a presumption against such an
application. In order to overcome the presumption, it must be shown
that there was a clear congressional intent that the statute was to
have extraterritorial application.
The court concluded that the nature of the acts prohibited by the
MMPA does not compel its application in foreign waters. It was
noted that the MMPA is a conservation statute and that by its nature
it is based on the proposition that a sovereign has control of the
natural resources within its boundaries.
Support for this analysis was found in various authorities relating
to international law such as the United Nations resolution on "Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources." 6 The court felt that
the Congress certainly recognized the power of nations to exercise
dominion over their own resources when the MMPA was enacted.
Note was also taken of § 1378 of the MMPA which directs the
Secretary of State to start negotiations with foreign states in order to
obtain agreements to protect marine mammals. For these reasons,
the court inferred that the MMPA by its nature was not meant to
apply in the "territories of other sovereigns."
With respect to the second principle of statutory construction, the
court stated that neither the statute on its face nor the legislative
history provide a clear expression of an intent that the MMPA should
be applied other than on the high seas or in waters under the control
of the United States. The government argued that by definition the
moratorium should be absolute-that there should be a complete ban
on the taking of marine mammals. This argument was rejected by the
court, relying on Foley Brothers, Inc. v. Filardo.7 There the Supreme
Court decided that a United States law which prohibited workers
employed by a firm engaged in United States government contract
work from laboring more than eight hours a day did not apply to
5.
6.
Res.
7.

260 U.S. 94 (1922).
United Nations Resolution on "Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources," G.A.
1803, U.N. GAOR 1193-1194 (1962).
336 U.S. 281 (1949).
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Americans engaged in such work in Iraq and Iran. The fact that
§ 1372 of the MMPA defined the prohibitions as extending only to
United States waters and the high seas allowed "the reasonable inference that Congress concluded the prohibitions should not extend
8
extraterritorially."
The court also took note of § 1373 and § 1374, which establish
the permit system to allow the taking of marine mammals. Permits
are to be issued only in conformance with regulations, which are to
be based in large part upon scientific evidence. Because the court felt
that scientific data could not be readily gathered in foreign waters,
they concluded that the permit system was only meant to apply to
United States waters and the high seas.
Finally, the court examined the legislative history of the Act and
noted discussion of the hunting of baby harp seals off the Canadian
coast. In this regard only a ban on the import of the sealskins was
mentioned in the record. A prohibition on Americans participating in
the hunt was not discussed, although the court felt Congress had the
power to make such a prohibition. Also, the placement of the moratorium in the Act was viewed as providing marine mammals with
additional protection. However, the court did not view this protection as an intention to extend the territorial jurisdiction of the Act,
but only to prevent the issuance of permits except in very controlled
and limited situations.
For these reasons, the court concluded that the MMPA was not
intended by Congress to apply to the waters controlled by other
sovereign nations, stating that:
It is no small matter when, in effect, this nation countermands a
permit of another nation allowing the permittee to work in the territorial waters of the foreign country. We cannot say that the interests

of the United States in preserving dolphins outweighs the interest of

the Commonwealth of the Bahamas in preserving its character as a
tourist attraction by the issuance of a limited number of permits for
the capture of dolphins within its narrow band of territorial waters. 9
Because the court concluded that the MMPA was only intended to
apply to the takings of marine mammals in the waters of the United
States and on the high seas, Mitchell's conviction for taking dolphins
in Bahamian waters under a Bahamian permit was reversed.
BILL MOYERS

8. Supra note 1, at 1004.
9. Id.

